Malignant Moments: Biford Dolphin Accident footage exposed. The Biford Dolphin incident is one of the most frightening accidents in recent history. On that horrific day, the four divers present in the dissolution room could not even understand what happened and was destroyed in less than a second time. It was a cruel and tortured death, marking one of the most dark chapters in diving history. Description of accident at wisescapelearning.com
Deadly Moments: Biford Dolphin Accident footage exposed
I. Origin of Biford Dolphin Accident Footage
The Biford Dolphin Drilling Rig is currently located in the North Sea. Rig has faced several serious accidents throughout its operation, including the 1983 explosive disintegration Biford Dolphin accident footage, claiming the lives of 5 workers and injured another. A sudden change in pressure due to opening, closing and re -opening can lead to immediate explosive disintegration, resulting in severe injuries and potential deaths in close proximity. In addition, it produces slightly less severe but still significant pressure drop in any attached location with it. Both chambers and rooms experience pressure when closed and release rapid pressure on opening.
The Biford Dolphin Fred is a semi-subsidized drilling rig stable by the column operated by Dolphin Drilling, a subsidiary of Fred Olsen Energy. It performs seasonal drilling for various companies in the UK, Denmark and Norway related areas in the North Sea. It was registered in Hamilton, Bermuda. In 2019, there was a discussion about decomination to Rig.
Origin of biford dolphin
Ii. Description
Originally manufactured as a deep marine drilling vessel, it was the first in the highly successful Aur H -3 series designed by the Akara Group and was completed in 1974 at the Akar Wardle Shipyard.
Birdford dolphin has a total length of 108.2 m (355 ft), width of 67.4 m (221 ft) and depth of 36.6 m (120 ft). It has a depth of maximum drilling 6,100 meters (20,000 ft) and can work on a depth of 460 m (1,500 ft). Equipped with advanced drilling devices, Biford Dolphin initially completed stringent certification levels under the Norwegian Act, although it was later banned from working in Norwegian water. It can proceed using its own engines to combat flow and ocean currents, but for long distance movements, it needs to be towed by special tugboats.
Technical specification of biford dolphin
- Operating Deck Load: 3,025 tonnes
- Crew Housing: 102 people
- Operating water depth: maximum 460 meters (1,500 ft)
- Deric: Shafar 49 meters (160 ft) binoculars mast
- Muring System: 12 digits
- Blowout Preventive: Hydril 476 mm (18.7 in), 10,000 KPA (1,500 PSI)
- Sabasia Processing System: Christmas Tree
- Floor Crane: 2 × 40 Ton
Iii. Biford dolphin accident footage
Deep sea drilling rig accident
On March 1, 1976, Rig ran the upground during the transfer from a place in the North Sea to Bergan. All the crew members were evacuated, but six people fell from the vessel and lost their lives.
Diving bell accident
On Saturday, November 5, 1983 at 4:00 am, four divers were connected to a small trunk (a small passage) inside the diving vine system on the deck of rigs connected to each other, while drilling in the frigger gas field in the Norwegian sector of North Sea. Divers Edwin Arthur Coward (British, age 35), Roy P. Lucas (British, 38 years), Bjørn Giæver Bergersen (Norwegian, 29 years), and Truls Hellevik (Norwegian, 34 years). He was assisted by two dive tenders, William Crimes (British, 32 years old), and Martin Saunders.
At the time of Biford dolphin crash footage, the decampration chambers 1 and 2 (with unused third chamber) were connected to the diving vine through a trunk. The connection of the trunk was tightly sealed by a clamp operated by experienced divers. Coward and Lucas were resting in Chamber 2 under 9 ATM pressure. The diving bell of Bergarson and Hellevic was hoisted after a dive and the hatch was secured. Except for their wet equipment in the hatch, both divers climbed through the hatch in Chamber 1.
Normal process will be:
- Close the diving vine, which must be opened for hatch.
- Increase the pressure slightly in the diving vine to seal the door of the diving bell.
- Close Chamber 1, also a hatch known for diving bell.
- Decampresses from inside the tank until 1 ATM pressure is reached.
- Release clamps to separate the diving bell from the chamber system.
The first two phases were completed when Crimand accidentally opened the clamp, which was closed to the chamber by Hellavik (diver 4). As a result, the chamber was immediately decomposed under 1 ATM pressure from 9 ATMs. The wind came out of the chamber system with tremendous force, blocked the door of the hatch from inside and pushed the diving bell from a distance, two tender collapsed in the head. All four divers were destroyed; One of the tenders, Crimeund, died, while Saunders were seriously injured.
Iv. Medical conclusion
The medical examination conducted on the remains of four divers revealed significant conclusions. In particular, there was a large amount of fat in the arteries, large veins and heart chambers, as well as endothelial fat in organs, especially liver. This fat was not able to create an obstruction, but was certainly prevented by blood on the site. Autopesy showed that the bubble formation in the blood replaced lipoprotein complexes, providing lipid insoluble. This fat, now insoluble, can be the cause of their circulation stagnation.
Coward, Lucas, and Bergarson were affected by decomposition explosion and died on positions indicated in the diagram. Forensic probe by a pathologist determined that due to the process of experience of helevic, highest pressure and securing the interior door, was forced to squeeze through a 60 cm (24 in) long chisel -sized gaps that were made by the jam hatch door. Along with avoiding wind and pressure, it included her chest cavity clipping, which led to the fragmentation of her body, followed by the removal of all the thoracic and intestinal organs, except a part of the trachea and the small intestine, and a part of the thoracic spine. They were estimated at some distance, some were found to be high up to 10 meters (30 feet) above the door of external pressure.
Investigation
The Biford Dolphin Accident Footage Investigation Committee concluded that the human error by the diver tender was the reason. The hatch door was designed with a central kaj, a butterfly valve similar to the disc, and it swung far to the left, causing the inner hatch lip to open the door opening. This left the difference of a chisel like an open manhole cover, but was fixed. It created a hole with a diameter of 24 inches (61 cm). It is not clear whether the tender opened the clamp before the order of an observer, his own initiative, or misunderstanding, was opened by the tender before being depressed. At that time, the only communication of tenders outside the chamber system was through a wall-mounted loudspeaker; With a loud noise from the drilling rig and the sea, it was challenging to hear what was happening. After a long time, fatigue also affected the divers, who usually worked in a 16-hour shift.
This Biford dolphin accident footage was also considered a technical failure. Since 1975, the old Biford dolphin diving system lacked safety hatch doors, external pressure gauge and interlocking mechanisms, which could prevent the hatch from opening when the chamber system was under pressure. Before the accident, the nurse’s Veritas issued the certification rules: “The connecting structures between the bell and the chamber should be arranged so that they are not operated when the trunk is under pressure,” thus those systems require unprotected seal and interlocking mechanisms. A month after the accident, the Nurse’s Veritas and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate issued the final rules for all bell systems.
Among other people, members of the former crew members of Biford Dolphin and NOPEF (a NOPEF oil and petrochemical workers union) came forward, claiming that the investigation was a cover-up. He alleged that the Accident Investigation Committee in its report failed to address the allocation of responsibility for important tools required by COMEX and was entrusted by the authorized Diving Department to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate of the Norwegian Petroleum. He also accused of being caused by lack of appropriate equipment, including the interlocking mechanism (unable to open the chamber system when under pressure), external pressure gauge, and equipped with safe communication systems, which were all delayed by the allocation by the Directorate of Norwegian Petroleum.
trial
The North Sea diver coalition proceeded for further investigation, established by the first divers in the North Sea in the North Sea and established by relatives of the deceased. In February 2008, he received a report that showed that the real reason was equipment failure. Roy Lucas’s daughter Claire Lucas said: “I could say that my father was killed by the Norwegian government because they knew that they were diving in an unsafe decomposition room.” The families of the previous divers finally received compensation from the Norwegian government 26 years after the incident.
Please note that all the information presented in this article is obtained from a variety of sources, including wikipedia.org and many other newspapers. Although we have tried our best to verify all the information, we cannot guarantee that everything mentioned is correct and has not been verified 100%. Therefore, we recommend caution when referring to this article or using it as a source in our own research or report.
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